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INTRODUCTION
As has happened in the past,' the rising incidence of consumer
bankruptcy filings has again precipitated calls for legislative reform of the
bankruptcy law.2 The latest steady rise in the filing statistics, having oc-
curred during the first years under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 3 has
spawned a natural tendency to associate the increase in filings with provi-
sions of the Act itself.4 Downplayed in the analysis are factors which are
less readily susceptible of legislative management - increased media
coverage of bankruptcy as a solution to debt;s the probably-related decrease
in the "stigma" attached to bankruptcy;6 the increased interest by the
private bar in bankruptcy practice;7 the post-World War I rise in consumer
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., Rutgers the State University of New Jersey School of Law - Camden. This author
wishes to acknowledge generous financial support provided by Indiana University School of Law - In,
dianapolis.
* *Associate Professor of Finance, Faculty of Management, University of Calgary. B.Sc., University
of Pennsylvania; M.Sc., London School of Economics; Ph.D., University of Exeter.
'See, e.g., Report of the Commission on the Bankuptcy Laws of the U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part 1,
93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Commission Report, Part I or Part II];
Friebolin, Against Conditional or Suspended Discharge, 50 COM. LJ. 197 (1945); Sturges & Cooper,
Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, 42 YAuz L.J. 487, 488-89 (1933).
2Sec, e.g., Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv. 953 (1981); R. Johnson, et
al., MONOGRAPHS Nos. 2.3 AND 24, CONSUMER BAN, iupcy STUDY VOLUMEs I mm II (Credit Research
Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue Univ. 1982); S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1982).
311 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Reform Act or the Code].
4Two bills to change consumer bankruptcy provisions of the Reform Act were pending in Congress
at the conclusion of the last session: S.2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1982). The Senate view was "that provisions of the Code have played a substantial role in
stimulating the number of bankruptcy filings." S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). See
generally Schuchman and Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt.Out Hearings and Other Purposes, 56
Am. B-Nmx. L. J. 1, 1-3 (1982).
5See Schuchman & Rhorer, supra note 4 at 2.
61d.
7See, e.g., Tell, Chasing the Bankruptcy Bumblers, NAT'L L. J. 1 (May 11, 1981).
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borrowing;8 the progressive depersonalization of the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship; 9 the general downturn in the economy; etc., etc.
The relationship between bankruptcy filings and provisions of the
Reform Act is commonly expressed in terms of "incentive": attractive provi-
sions of the Act are said to provide debtors with "incentives" to choose
bankruptcy.I1 More specifically, if the provisions of the bankruptcy law are
made more attractive to debtors, more of them will select that option as a
solution to their financial problems." A corollary of this idea is commonly
used to deal with rising bankruptcy rates: make the law less attractive to
debtors and less of them will choose bankruptcy.12 The argument is made
yet more specific for purposes of policymaking: if this or that specific provi-
sion of the law is made less attractive, fewer debtors will choose bankrupt
cy, all other things being equal.13
But the purported relationship between the attractiveness of the bank-
ruptcy law and the rate of voluntary filings may not hold for specific, in-
dividual provisions of the law thought to be attractive. 14 The provision in
question may not, in fact, be attractive to most debtors. Debtors may not
know that the provision is attractive at the time they exercise their choice.
The attractiveness of the provision in question may, unknown to observers,
be controlled by some other provision which is being ignored in the analysis.
Or debtors may not act rationally about choosing a solution to their financial
problems.'5 The incentive approach, if utilized without adequate data and
analysis, can result in sacrificing whatever good the attractive provision was
designed to achieve without obtaining the hoped-for reduction in bankrupt-
cy filings.
Recent expressions of this "incentive" approach to bankruptcy policy
making are to be found in connection with exemption provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and, specifically, in connection with a provision 6 of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act popularly known as the "opt-out provision."' 7
8See Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 1, Part I, at 49.
9See generally Douglas and Marshall, Some Aspects of Bankruptcy Administration, 32 CoLuM. L. Ray.
25, 49-54 (1932); Hamilton, In re the Small Debtor, 42 YAix L. J. 473 (1933); Cf. Schuchman, An Attempt
at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 403, 428-39 (1973).
'oSee, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, Vol. II, at 136-38.
"Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PROBS. No. 4, 13, 26-27 (1977). Cf. Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy,
41 LAw & Coirrmsp. PaoBs. No. 4, 47, 47-48 (1977).
12See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 142-43.
3Id. at 143.
14See generally Schuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 LAw & CoN-
TEmp. PRoas. No. 4, 66 (1977).
'sSee id. at 84-89.
1611 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1980).
7""Opt-out" is the term widely used by courts and commentators to describe a state's legislative ac-
tion of denying to its debtors the exemption rights found in section 522(d) of the Reform Act. See, e.g., In
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The provision allows states by suitable legislation to foreclose to their debt-
ors the property exemptions' s found within the Reform Act 19 and to
substitute for the federal provisions a set of exemptions of the state's own
making. The Reform Act's opt-out provision, unique in United States
bankruptcy legislation, was a political compromise between those who saw
uniform bankruptcy exemptions as a necessary part of comprehensive bank-
ruptcy reform2o and others who wished to leave bankruptcy exemption deci-
sions with the states where they had been under the 1898 Act.2' From a
larger perspective, the opt-out compromise is yet another episode in the
ongoing policy struggle about whether the statutory source of bankruptcy
exemptions should be Congress or the state legislatures.22
The reform movement for a return to an earlier form of bankruptcy
legislation containing uniform, federal bankruptcy exemptions23 had begun in
re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982) at 1131; Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L.Rav.769, 774 (1980).
'
8The exemption provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, section 522, generally defines the proper-
ty a debtor will retain from the bankruptcy estate following bankruptcy.
IThe operative authorization for opting-out in section 522 reads:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may ex,
empt from property of the estate either -
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless
the State law that is applicable to the debtor.., specifically does not so
authorize....
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(1980) (emphasis added).
Among the federal bankruptcy exemptions found in section 522(d) are $7,500 worth of property used
as a residence, § 522(d)(1); $1,200 of interest in a motor vehicle, § 522(d)(2); limited interests in
household goods and jewelry, § 522(d)(3) and (4); limited interests in tools of the trade, § 522(d)(6); cer-
tain interests in life insurance policies, § 522(d)(7) and (8); and alimony, social security and other rights
to periodic payments, as well as certain limited rights of action, § 522(d)(10) and (11). The federal provi-
sion also has a "spillover provision" which permits a non-homeowner to utilize the value of the homestead
exemption available to homeowners. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5)(1980).
2
°See, e.g., Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. Rav. 678 (1960);
Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 1, Part II, at 125-30.
2
rsection 6 of the 1898 Act provided:
Sec. 6 Exemptions of Bankrupts
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are
prescribed by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the
State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months or the greater por-
tion thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898) (repealed 1979).
22Our first two attempts at bankruptcy legislation, the Acts of 1800 and 1841, had self-contained
bankruptcy exemptions for use by all bankrupts. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 34, 35, 2 Stat. 30,
31 (1800); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 400, 443 (1841). Under the Act of 1867, a debtor
in bankruptcy could utilize federal exemptions found in the Act and state exemptions as well. Bankruptcy
Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517, 522-23 (1867). State law became the source of bankruptcy ex-
emptions only in our fourth try at bankruptcy legislation, the 1898 Act. See supra note 21.23See supra note 22.
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the late 1950's when observers began to focus on the anachronistic state ex-
emption legislation which the provisions of the 1898 Act made applicable in
bankruptcy. State exemption provisions had been largely ignored in this cen-
tury and their use in bankruptcy was eventually perceived by reformers to
be interfering with the federal policy of providing the bankrupt debtor with
a "fresh start." But in response to the early call for uniform federal bankrupt-
cy exemptions to be supplied by federal reform legislation itself24 came the
rejoinder that uniform bankruptcy exemptions which were more generous
than state counterparts would drive debtors to voluntary bankruptcy in
order to keep more property from creditors; and conversely, more niggardly
federal exemptions than their state counterparts would induce creditors to
precipitate involuntary bankruptcy in order to get more property than is
available outside bankruptcy.25 This notion did not capture the favor of the
Bankruptcy Commission26 which recommended uniform federal bankruptcy
exemptions anyway. 27 However, the argument might well have helped pro-
24E.g., Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 Ruroass L. Rrv. 678 (1960);
Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L. J. 1459 (1959).2$E.g,, Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. Rsv. 445, 452 (1960); ef. W.
WAxsi & W. HOGAN, DEBToR-CRaITOR LAW 120 (2d ed. 1981).
26Indeed, Professor Kennedy, an early spokesperson of the view, apparently altered his views as the
head of the Bankruptcy Commission. In testimony before Congress he stated:
The Commission was aware of and concerned by the possibility that a discrepancy
between state and federal exemptions may provide an artificial incentive for filing
petitions in bankruptcy. If the federal exemptions are more generous than the state
exemption, a debtor may seek relief in bankruptcy in order to get the advantage of
the larger allowance against creditors. If the federal exemptions are less liberal
than the state law, creditors may wish to place their debtor in bankruptcy to reach
the property that is exempt under state law. The Commission was at first troubled
and deterred by this consideration from proposing federal exemptions but ultimate
ly concluded that it was an insufficient basis for recommending either preemption
of the field by federal law or retention of the present incorporation of state exemp-
tion laws by reference into the Bankruptcy Act. The fact that bankruptcy is an
available recourse for the debtor or the creditors will be a limitation on the extent
to which the parties will rely on their rights as determined by state law. They will
negotiate and settle in the light of what advantages and disadvantages are
available under both systems. The fact that bankruptcy requires a surrender of all
nonexempt property and still carries a stigma will be deterrents to a person con-
templating voluntary bankruptcy to get the advantage of a more generous exemp-
tion. The realization that the debtor will probably get a discharge and that all
creditors will share in the distribution of proceeds of the sale of nonexempt assets
will be substantial deterrents to creditors contemplating involuntary bankruptcy
as a way of reaching assets of their debtor that are beyond their reach under state
law.
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcom. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 170 (1975-76).
27Bankruptcy Commission Report, supra note 1, at 125-30.
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duce the Code's opt-out provision 28 which permits states to reject the set of
exemptions contained in the Code and to substitute state provisions for the
rejected federal exemptions. 29 Perhaps more important, the argument that
larger federal bankruptcy exemptions 30 will induce the filing of voluntary
bankruptcy petitions3' has probably influenced the opt-out decisions of some
of the legislatures of the thirty-two states which have thus far optedout.32
An unintended benefit of the Reform Act's opt-out provision is the
unique opportunity it affords to empirically test the hypothesized connec-
tion between statutory exemption levels in personal bankruptcy and the
rate of voluntary bankruptcy filings. We set out to determine whether such
an influence could be detected;33 the purpose of this article is to report on
and discuss our findings.
-The opt-out compromise itself has almost no legislative history. See In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131,
1136(7th Cir. 1982). We have found no mention of the incentive idea in that meager legislative history.
2911 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1980).
30Because section 522(b) permits a debtor in a state which has not opted-out to choose either federal
or state exemptions for bankruptcy purposes, smaller federal exemptions than the state's counterpart will
not, in theory, be a disincentive for a debtor to file for voluntary bankruptcy or a corresponding incentive
for a creditor to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition.
3
'The most forceful expression of this idea we have found was contained in a plea to the South
Carolina legislature to opt-out:
[U]nless the General Assembly enacts a specific statute depriving debtors of the
right to claim the federal exemptions enumerated in section 522(d), a substantial
and perhaps irresistible incentive to file consumer bankruptcies will arise with the
probable result of a significant increase in the rate of consumer bankruptcies in
South Carolina.
Lacy, South Carolina's Statutory Exemptions and Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 S.C.L. Rav. 643, 687 (1979).32More than three-fourths of the states which have opted-out have manifested an intent through
their legislation that debtors in both systems be afforded the same exemption protection. See Woodward,
Exemptions, Opting.Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 335, 344-45 (1982). Opt out legislation
thus far is as follows:
ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1981); Asuz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133 (Supp. 1981); ARx. STAT. ANN. §
36-210 (Supp. 1981); COLO. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 13-54-107 (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE AN. tit. 10, § 4914
(Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1601 (Supp. 1981);
IDAHO CODE § 11-609 (Supp. 1982); LLa. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Im. CODE
ANN. § 34-2-28-0.5 (Burns Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-2312 (Supp. 1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 427.170 (Supp. 1980); LA. Ray. STAT. AN. § 13:3881(b)
(West Supp. 1982); Mi. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 4425 (Supp. 1981); MD. CTs. & Jun. PRoc. CODE
ANN. § 11-504(g) (Supp. 1981);MoNT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (1981); NEB. Ray. STAT. §§ 25-15, -105
(Supp. 1981); NEv. REv. STAT. § 21.090(3) (1982); N.H. Ray. STAT. Am. § 511:2-a (Supp. 1981); Act
ofJune 2, 1981, ch. 490, § 1, 1981, ch. 490, § 1, 1981 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. No. 6 at 20 (to be codified
at N.C. Gm. STAT. § IC-1601(f) ); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1981); Omo Ray. CODE ANN. §
2329.662 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1(B) (West Supp. 1981); OL RaV. STAT. § 23.305
(1981); S.C. CODE ANm. § 15-41-425 (Law Co-Op. Supp. 1981); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 43-45-13
(Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANm. § 26-2-112 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-15 (Supp. 1981); VA.
CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1982).
33At least one other researcher has attempted to study the effects of different exemption levels on
debtors in bankruptcy. Future Earnings: Hearings on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (statement of Robert W.
Johnson).
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I. BACKGROUND
An exemption statute is one that defines a certain quantity of a debtor's
real or personal property as unavailable to creditors in satisfaction of most
debts. 34 Exemption provisions have been part of American bankruptcy law
from its inception 35 and of state collection law from at least the early
1830's.36 The Bankruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841 contained their own ex-
emption provisions which operated without regard to state exemption
law.37 In 1867, as a concession to those states with liberal state exemption
provisions, 38 Congress for the first time not only set uniform federal exemp-
tions but also allowed debtors in bankruptcy to utilize state exemption pro-
visions as well. 39 Under the Acts of 1841 and 1867, exemptions arguably
could have made a difference in the decision to file for voluntary
bankruptcy:40 under both schemes, larger federal exemptions than the state
counterparts could have lowered the threshold for filing a voluntary petition
because more property would be protected from creditors as a result of filing
a bankruptcy petition than would be protected outside.41 The Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 eliminated federal bankruptcy exemptions and, instead, simply
incorporated into its operation the exemption provisions of the state in
which the debtor was domiciled.42 What developed from this scheme was
the idea that there was a quantity of property which was protected from the
involuntary payment of debts whether that payment was extracted through
34Exemption statutes typically "except" certain types of debts from their operation. For example, in
most places, a debtor owing alimony will not derive protection from the exemption provisions. See, e.g.,
Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERs L. Rav. 678, 708-709 (1960).
Because the Reform Act contains federal provisions addressing many of these issues, the "excepted
creditor" has created knotty problems of choice of law under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See generally
Stem, State Exemption Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a Medium for Appraising Aspects of
Bankruptcy Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. Rav. 70 (1980).
3rhe 1800 Act, our first, exempted necessary wearing apparel and bedding plus a percentage of the
estate not to exceed $800. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 34, and 35, 2 Stat. 19, 23, 30-31
(1800).
36Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YAiE L. J. 1459, 1463 (1959); Rom-
bauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes - Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. Rav. 484, 485 (1961).
37Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 34, 35, 2 Stat. 19, 23, 30-31 (1800); Bankruptcy Act of
1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841).
3sC. WARREN, BANKRupTcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 103 (1935).
39Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517, 522-23 (1867).
4oVoluntary bankruptcy was unavailable under the 1800 Act. See C. WARREN, BANKRuPrcy IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 27 (1935).
411n addition, under the same reasoning, under the 1841 scheme smaller federal exemptions than their
state counterparts could supply a disincentive to filing voluntary bankruptcy and an incentive for
creditors to precipitate involuntary bankruptcy. Cf. Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45
IOWA L. REv. 445, 452 (1960).
42Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898). The text of section 6 is quoted in
supra note 21.
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bankruptcy or through state collection mechanisms. 43 Indeed, the operation
of the 1898 Act also treated such issues as waiver of exemptions, the validi-
ty of security interests in exempt property, and the validity of exemption
rights against special favored claimants44 as matters of state law thereby in-
creasing the parity of treatment of debtors in and out of bankruptcy.4. In
short, the 1898 Act went a long way in eliminating whatever exemption,
related incentive there might have been under prior Acts. The elimination of
an exemption-based incentive does not appear to have had anything to do
with incorporation of these provisions into the 1898 Act.
Rather, as indicated earlier,46 the notion that different bankruptcy ex-
emptions would have an effect on the bankruptcy rates seems to have
developed much later, at about the time that the 1898 Act's exemption
scheme was being challenged as an impediment to the fresh start objectives
of bankruptcy. At first blush, the idea has a compelling ring: if debtors are
rational maximizers, 47 one would think that the prospect of keeping more
property from creditors through bankruptcy would induce some debtors to
choose bankruptcy who would not have otherwise done so. Perhaps more
important for policy makers is the corollary: reducing or eliminating this in-
centive - that is making federal bankruptcy exemptions closer to or the
same as state exemptions - will slow the rate of bankruptcy filings. 48
The opt-out provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act gave state legisla-
tures just such an opportunity to try to slow the rate of bankruptcy filings
by eliminating the differential between state and Bankruptcy Code exemp-
tions. With the simple addition of one or two sentences to its exemption
statutes, 49 a state could make its own state exemptions operate in bankrupt
cy much as they had prior to the Reform Act.50 Most of the thirty-two
states which opted-out did, in fact, simply replace the Code's exemptions
43See, e.g., Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902); In re Kanter, 505 F.2d 228,
231 (9th Cir. 1974).
44See supra note 34.
43See Stem, State Exemption Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a Medium for Appraising
Aspects of Bankruptcy Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. Ra,. 70, 74-77 (1980).
46See text at notes 23-27, supra.
47See R. PosNR, EcoNoMIc ANA.ysis op LAw 1 (1973).
4BCf. supra note 31.49For example, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
No person, as an individual debtor under the federal bankruptcy reform act of
1978 [sic] (11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.), may elect exemptions pursuant to subsec-
tion (b)(1) of section 522 of such federal act.
30The operation of state exemptions in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Reform Act is different
from their operation under the 1898 law because, among other things, federal law now probably controls
such matters as waivers (11 U.S.C. § 522(e) ), debts excepted from the operation of the exemptions (11
U.S.C. § 522(c) ), and the validity of certain security interests in exempt property (11 U.S.C. §
522(0(2) ). To the extent that federal bankruptcy law differs from state law on these issues, the proceeds
of a given opt-out state's exemption may be different in bankruptcy than outside. See generally Wood-
ward, Exemptions, Opting.Out and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 Osero ST. LJ. 335, 354-60 (1982).
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with those exemptions available to debtors generally outside of
bankruptcy.51 In the process, each state that opted-out also reduced signifi
cantly the value of the exemptions available to non-homeowners in bank-
ruptcy.' 2 The supposed incentive having been eliminated in such states, yet
arguably present in varying degrees in non-opt-out states, researchers are
presented with at least two samples - an "incentive group" and a "no incen-
tive group" - whose bankruptcy rates can be compared statistically.
II. METHODOLOGY
In constructing a method to test the "incentive hypothesis," we at-
tempted simply to duplicate, in experimental form, the hypothesis itself. The
idea is that debtors are drawn by higher exemptions to bankruptcy and,
therefore, states which have larger bankruptcy exemptions than non-
bankruptcy exemptions will experience higher bankruptcy rates than will
states without such a difference in exemption provisions. We therefore
focussed on the exemption provisions of the states and of the Code and not
on the characteristics of debtors who might make decisions under those pro-
visions. We thus defined "incentive" in the way it is defined in the hy-
pothesis: access to larger exemption provisions when a debtor is in
bankruptcy than when he is not in bankruptcy. Our results must be inter-
preted in light of our central focus on the statutory provisions themselves; as
will be discussed later, the results under our method of testing underscore
the oversimplification implicit in the incentive hypothesis.
Preparing the data for statistical testing involved ascertaining, for each
fiscal year" in question, those states whose debtors had access to larger ex-
emptions in bankruptcy than outside of bankruptcy.54 This "incentive"
group contained two types of states: those non-opt-out states55 that had ex-
sSe id. at 344.
52Because of the Code's "spillover provision," 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5)(1980), the value of the Code's
$7,500 homestead provision may be used by non-homeowners in bankruptcy. States, on the other hand,
do not create the parity between homeowners and non-homeowners found in the Code because state
homestead exemptions are restricted to homeowners. The result is that the "spillover provision" pro-
duces a higher exemption level for non-homeowners than that which was available in any opt-out state
prior to the state's opting-out. Each of the states in our study that opted-out significantly lowered the
statutory exemption level available to non-homeowners from what it was prior to the opt-out.
S3"Fiscal years" as used here run from July 1 to June 30. Fiscal year 1980, for example, began July 1,
1979 and ended June 30, 1980.
'
4Because at least one state opted-out in each of the years the Code has been in effect, the members
of this group changed each year. Our fiscal years ran from July 1 to June 30; a state which opted-out on or
prior to December 31 of a given year was considered to have opted-out for the entire fiscal year in ques-
tion. Methodology and assumptions implicit in this study are more fully detailed in the Appendices, infra.
More detailed actual data on which this study is based is available from the authors or the publisher.
"The difficulties involved in comparing certain forms of state exemption provisions caused us to
eliminate certain states from the study. A number of states have exemption provisions which vary in ac-
1983) EXEMPTIONS: INCENTIVE TO BANKRUPTCY 61
emptions which were smaller5 6 than those available through the Bankruptcy
Code and those opt-out states which, through their own exemption
statutes, gave debtors in bankruptcy access to more exempt property than
given to debtors outside of bankruptcy. 57 We thus defined "incentive" for
purposes of this study by reference to the basic state and federal statutory58
exemption provisions alone; 59 no attempt was made to quantify the subtle
effects of differing procedure for claiming exemptions, the differing legal con-
texts in which such claims are asserted, or differing exemption related
cordance with the debtor's status as "head of household." IDAHo CODE 9A:55-1201 (Supp. 1981); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 52 § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN, STAT. § 513.425 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE 5A § 28-22-01 (Supp. 1981); S.D. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 43-31 (Supp. 1981); MONT. Rsv. CODES
ANN. § 25-13-611 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-1 (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 1
(Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 9A:28-1-1 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1981). These states
were excised from the study because we could find no reliable data on head-of-household bankruptcies
with which to construct a correction for these states.
5 6The approximate value of each state's and the Bankruptcy Code's real and personal property ex-
emption provisions was estimated in order to make this determination. Initially, state exemption values
were estimated for both homeowners and non-homeowners as well since many states have homestead
provisions unavailable to non-homeowners; the Bankruptcy Code, at present, makes no such distinc-
tions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (1980). Other studies suggest strongly that most persons who file voluntary
bankruptcy petitions do not own homes and, therefore, do not have access to homestead exemptions.
See, e.g., Schuchman, Little Bankruptcies in New England, 56 B.U.L. Rv. 685 (1976); Credit Research
Center, MONOGRAPH No. 24, CONsuMNE. BANKsucY STuDy, supra note 2, Vol. 11, 11-12. Consequent-
ly, we utilized the state exemption values for non-homeowners and constructed the samples discussed in
the text without regard to homestead exemptions unavailable to non-homeowners. Values used in con-
structing the actual samples are on file with the publisher.
57A few states have opted-out but have added special exemptions to bankruptcy debtors which are
unavailable to debtors generally. Examples include Ohio, Omo Ray. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.66(A)(4)(a),
(A)(17) (Page Supp. 1982), Kentucky, Ky. Ray. STAT. § 427.160 (Supp. 1981), Arkansas, ARx. STAT.
ANNs. § 36-210(a) (Supp. 1981), North Dakota, N. DAK. CENT. COD, § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. 1981). See
generally Woodward, Exemptions, Opting-Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 335, 369-71
(1982). Because such states continue a hypothetical incentive toward bankruptcy despite their opting-
out, they were included in the "incentive" group.
5tWe did not believe that state life insurance exemptions, comparable provisions of which are found
in the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(7)-(8)(1980) ), could have much impact on the bankrupt-
cy decisions of many debtors and consequently did not attempt to assess the influence of such provisions
on debtor behavior. See generally Appendices, infra.
-1Common law rules of law having the effect of immunizing debtor property outside of bankruptcy
were not taken into account in this study. Since the vast majority of debtors in bankruptcy do not own
real estate, see supra note 56, which might be protected by the tenancy by the entirety, we felt that the
incentive effects of such common law protection in non-opt-out states could be safely ignored in our com-
parisons of state and Code exemptions. In opt-out states, such interests are treated the same way in or
out of bankruptcy. Similarly, we have seen nothing to suggest that more than an extremely small percent-
age of debtors in bankruptcy might be holders of claims for personal injuries which common law doctrine
would generally protect from creditors. See S. RmsENMDW, CR.Eorros' Rs ssnms AD DEBTORs' PROTEC-
TIoN 229 (3d ed. 1979); Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws - Ex-
empt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 43-47 (1975); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 2D 1217 (1959). Spend-
thrift trusts are treated the same way in bankruptcy as outside. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)(1980); see generally
4 Cotu.. ON BANxR PTcY § 541.23 (15th ed.).
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rules 6O which the well informed debtor might take into account in assessing
the attractiveness of exemption provisions in the two systems. 61
The "no incentive" groups for each year were similarly constructed and
consisted of two types of states: those that had made exemptions the same
in both systems by the form of their opt-out and those states with exemp-
tions which were larger than those provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Since
the Code gives a debtor in bankruptcy in a state which has not opted-out
the choice of federal exemptions or state exemptions, 62 there is, in theory,
no exemption-related incentive affecting the choice of bankruptcy in the lat-
ter group. Whether such a state has opted-out or not, the debtor has access
to the relatively higher exemptions both in and out of bankruptcy.
In addition, a subgroup of each "incentive" group was created containing
those states in which the difference in value between exemptions available
in and out of bankruptcy was comparatively large. 63 The objective was to
see whether those states whose law contained a "big incentive" to bankrupt-
cy might have significantly higher bankruptcy rates than states in the "no in-
centive" group. The states making up the various samples as well as a more
detailed explanation of the methodology used in constructing this study can
be found in the Appendices.
III. STATISTICAL EXAMINATION
To statistically assess whether the new exemption provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act affected the rate of personal bankruptcies in the
states in the "incentive" groups, two alternative tests were applied: a sign
60Certain creditors may have access to exempt property outside of bankruptcy who would not have
such access inside bankruptcy. For example Indiana's exemption statute extends only to those debtors
who are liable "for any debt growing out of or founded upon a contract express or implied," I.C. 34-2-28-1
(1980), thereby offering no exemption protection to the debtor liable in tort. While by no means certain,
in bankruptcy, it may well be that the Indiana exemption operating through the Bankruptcy Code will
protect the debtor's exempt property against all forms of liability except those specified in 11 U.S.C. §
522(c), a section which does not give special status to tort creditors. See generally Stern, State Exemption
Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a Medium for Appraising Aspects of Bankruptcy Reform, 33
RUTGERS L. REv. 70 (1980).
Quantifying such subtle differences in the operation of the two systems is nearly impossible. In any
event, we believe that such differences would influence debtor decisions in very few cases.
61In this respect, the structure of our study replicates the incentive argument itself which is focused
almost exclusively on a comparison of the personal property exemptions found in the two systems.
6211 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1980).
63Any state in which the Code allowed the debtor to exempt $6,000 or more property in bankruptcy
than she could outside of bankruptcy was included in these groups. Members of all groups are listed in
the Appendices; specific estimates of the value of the provisions examined in this study are on file with
the publisher.
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test 64 and a rank sums test.65 Both methodologies can be used to determine
whether or not any two selected samples were likely to have been drawn
from the same parent population and, therefore, are not statistically dif-
ferent from one another. In this study, these tests were used to examine
whether or not the exemption provisions in the Bankruptcy Code resulted
in statistically significant differences in the bankruptcy rates between the
"incentive" groups and the "no incentive" groups described in the previous
section. The non-parametric sign test was used to compare the bankruptcy
rates of the two "incentive" groups for the fiscal years before the federal law
took effect, i.e.,,when there was no exemption-related "incentive," with the
rates of those states after the law was effective and the incentive was
hypothetically present. The rank sums test, on the other hand, was used to
compare the bankruptcy rates of the "incentive" groups with those of the
"no incentive" samples for each of the years that the Reform Act was in ef-
fect.
Before applying either of these tests to the state bankruptcy data, it was
important to convert the filing figures 66 to a per capita bankruptcy rate by
dividing each state's annual bankruptcies by the state population. This ad-
judgment results in year to year bankruptcies per capita for each state thus
assuring that all sample members are roughly comparable. 67 Further ad-
justments, to be discussed below, were also necessary to minimize economic
effects which, by themselves, could lead to significantly different bankrupt-
cy rates across the various samples being compared and thus distort the
resulting assessment of the effects of the exemption provisions of the Reform
Act.
The sign test was carried out on the bankruptcy data for the fiscal years
1978 and 1979. Using that test, the "incentive" samples were examined for
the periods before and after the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform
64The sign test is a nonparametric statistical criterion which is used to determine whether there are
significant differences between two samples which are related in such a manner that each observation
from one sample can be matched with a specific observation from the other sample. As applied here, it
was used to compare the bankruptcy rates for the "incentive" states before and after the effective date of
the BRA, i.e., before and after the "incentive" was in place. The null hypothesis, that the samples were
drawn from the same population, can be tested using the binomial distribution. The appropriate binomial
test is one-sided indicating that if the "incentive" effects are significant, this will be reflected in higher
bankruptcy rates for those incentive groupings.
63The rank sums or Mann Whitney U test is another nonparametric statistical test which can be
used to determine whether two samples are significantly different. Here, a "U" statistic is calculated by
jointly ranking the bankruptcy rates across the two samples and then summing the ranks for either of the
individual samples. On the basis of this count and the sizes of the two samples, the probability that the
two samples differ significantly can be determined.
66Filing figures were those for voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcies.
67State population figures were taken from the 1980 Census figures. As such, year to year interstate
migration is not captured in these per capita figures.
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Act.68 Our null hypothesis was that the "before" and "after" samples of both
of the incentive groupings were drawn from the same population. This im-
plies that the probability of an increase in any state's bankruptcy rate
(resulting from exemption provisions of the federal law) is 50% and thus
equivalent to the probability of a decrease.
Unfortunately, economic conditions deteriorated considerably over the
years being considered. Economic factors as well as other provisions of the
new law may have influenced the filing statistics. Over 70 percent of the 50
states had an increase in their bankruptcy rates from fiscal year 1978 to
fiscal year 1979 and then again from fiscal 1979 to fiscal 1980. The personal
bankruptcy rates in 48 of the 50 states increased during fiscal year 1980,
with South Dakota and Alaska being the only states registering a slight
decrease over that period. To correct for changes in general economic condi-
tions or other aspects of the change in law which may have influenced
bankruptcy rates over the period of interest, year to year state bankruptcy
rates were adjusted (either up or down) depending on whether the overall
average of all state bankruptcy rates for any given year was above or below
the state's average calculated over the 5 year period 1977 to 1981.69
The test results indicate that the bankruptcy rates for both of the incen-
tive samples (see Table, Appendix B) were unaffected by the exemption
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The number of increases in the
corrected bankruptcy rates between fiscal years 1978 and 1979 for those
states included in the "big incentive" sample was 13 out of maximum of 22
states; 11 were expected under the null hypothesis. For the larger sample of
"incentive" states which had their bankruptcy exemptions raised by the
Reform Act, even if by only a small amount, the number of corrected
bankruptcy rate increases was 20 out of a total sample size of 36, whereas 18
was the number expected under the null hypothesis. Although the actual
number of bankruptcy rate increases after the effective date of the Code is
slightly greater than expected under the null hypothesis, these differences
are not statistically significant. Accordingly, under this test the hypothesis
that the new exemption provisions in the Reform Act had no effect on the
rate of personal bankruptcies cannot be rejected.
68More specifically, the "before" period was July 1, 1978-June 30, 1979; the "after" period was Oc-
tober 1, 1979 (the effective date of the Reform Act) to June 30, 1980. The latter period was the first time
period during which filing statistics were kept under the Code's provisions. A correction was applied to
make the nine-month "after" period's figures comparable to the twelve-month "before" period's figures.
69Specifically, the bankruptcy rates for all 50 states were averaged for each year (from 1977 to 1981)
and then these were again averaged over the 5 year period. Each year's average rate was then expressed
as a fraction of the 5 year average resulting in an index ranging from .895 in 1978 to 1.23 in 1981. Each
state's yearly bankruptcy rate was then deflated by this index thus eliminating the effect of a deteriorat-
ing economy on the change in any state's bankruptcy rate over the period in question. Because bankrupt-
cy rates were the basis for adjustment here, other effects of the change from the 1898 Act to the Reform
Act were also eliminated.
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While one examines the same set of states in successive years using the
sign test, different samples of states in the same year can be compared using
the rank sums test. This makes the rank sums test somewhat stronger than
the sign test because the members from the two samples being examined do
not have to be matched, and therefore the samples do not have to be the
same size.70 Again, the null hypothesis was that the "incentives" generated
by the Reform Act's exemption provisions were not, in themselves, signifi-
cant enough to affect the rate of voluntary bankruptcies and thus we would
not expect statistically significant differences between the incentive and no
incentive samples during the period after the federal legislation took effect.
As indicated earlier, changing conditions from year to year first had to
be eliminated under the sign test before the possible effects of the Reform
Act on personal bankruptcies could be examined over two successive years.
Because the rank sums test is applied to different samples over a single
period of time, overall year to year changes do not affect the test results.
Interstate differences due to local economic conditions could, however,
result in different bankruptcy rates across any two selected samples of
states. It is clear, for example, that the effects of the recession are not
distributed equally across the 50 states. Certain states like Michigan were
affected considerably more than some of the more prosperous states in the
southwest. Indeed, certain states like Alaska were hardly affected at all by
the economic downturn. If, by chance, the various incentive or no-incentive
state samples are geographically bunched either in above average or below
average unemployment regions, drawing conclusions from these sample
bankruptcy rates about the possible effect of the BRA will not be possible.
Differences (or lack of differences) in the bankruptcy rates of the samples
could be explained by factors other than "incentive" differences associated
with exemption provisions of the Reform Act. Using a methodology
somewhat similar to that suggested earlier for eliminating the effects of year
to year changes in nationwide average bankruptcy rates, states rates were
adjusted to eliminate or at least reduce interstate economic differences
within any fiscal year.71
The results of the rank sums test support our earlier findings. Although
701n general, the less restrictions required by a statistical test, the stronger the statistical test is con-
sidered to be.
7 1To adjust the bankruptcy rates for interstate economic differences, income per capita figures were
collected for each state over the period 1979 to 1981. For each year, the income per capita was averaged
across the 50 states, with the resulting figure used to deflate each individual state's per capita income.
Wealthy states had indices which were greater than one while the poorer states had figures less than
one. These state economic indices were then used to deflate or inflate the actual state bankruptcy rates
to eliminate interstate differences in bankruptcy rates that were likely to have been caused by economic
differences.
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there were differences in the median bankruptcy rates calculated for the in-
centive and no incentive state groupings in various periods, these differences
were never statistically significant.72 These results were found for each of
the fiscal years considered. The "incentive" and "no incentive" samples ap-
peared to be drawn from the same population. Under the tests we applied to
the data, the exemption provisions of the Act itself had no statistically
significant influence on the level of personal bankruptcies.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
One must interpret the results of this study with caution. For the years
tested, this study establishes only that there is no statistically significant
relationship between state bankruptcy rates and the incentive to bankrupt-
cy, as we defined it, found in the state's applicable bankruptcy exemption
provisions. At minimum, the results suggest that the dynamics of the
debtor's bankruptcy decision are far more complex than the exemption-
incentive notion recognizes; the results also underscore the oversimplifica-
tion implicit in the incentive notion. In addition, the results also show that
the simple reduction in present Code exemption levels probably will not
result in a significant reduction in the number of voluntary bankruptcy fil-
ings - all but one member 73 of the "no incentive" group have reduced the
value of the non-homeowner bankruptcy exemption provisions in their
states and yet the group has not realized significantly lower numbers of local
bankruptcy filings. 74
As one of us has suggested elsewhere, 7" several reasons might explain
the results found in this study. Assuming that larger bankruptcy exemptions
offer an incentive to choose voluntary bankruptcy, it would seem on reflec-
tion that such an incentive controls the bankruptcy decision in relatively
few cases. The decision to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition is a highly
complex one involving for some debtors serious questions of morality and
self-worth as it may involve notions of retaliation or simple debt avoidance
for others. Studies have suggested, for example, that gaining the immediate
relief from creditor collection efforts is often a precipitating cause of
72Actual results of these individual tests which were performed with a computer are on file at the
author's office at the University of Calgary.
73Texas is the only state in the study where non-homeowner exemptions were as large as the Code's.
Although it did not opt-out, it was therefore included in the "no incentive" group.
74The Senate Report accompanying S.2000 emphasized the rise in bankruptcy filings as an impetus to
the legislation. S. REP. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). Proposed as part of the legislation was the
reduction of exemption levels specified by the Code. Id. at 18-19. To the extent that some reduction in
the bankruptcy rates was anticipated as a result of the proposed reduction in exemptions, the results of
this study suggest that the anticipated rate reduction is unwarranted.
7See generally Woodward, Exemptions, Opting.Out and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 O1Uo ST. L.J. 335
(1982).
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bankruptcy 76 and that a debtor's incurring large medical expenses often
precedes the debtor's decision to file for bankruptcy. 77 It may well be that
these or other comparably strong reasons simply control the bankruptcy
decisions - that debtors choosing bankruptcy will choose it regardless of
the exemption level that comes with the choice of bankruptcy. If the
exemption-incentive is controlled in most individual cases by other variables
of much greater importance, evidence of an exemption incentive will not
show up in a statistically significant way in the bankruptcy rates.
The time at which the debtor makes the decision to choose bankruptcy
may also explain the results. It may well be that most consumer debtors
decide on bankruptcy before they have any awareness of the significance of
exemptions at all. Reasons other than the state's exemption differential
probably prompt the debtor's initial consideration of bankruptcy as a solu-
tion to debt and the decision to file a bankruptcy petition may well be made
in many cases before the debtor learns of the state's exemption differential. If
that is so, once again, one would not perceive a significant exemption-
related influence on the bankruptcy rates. Since no state exempts less prop-
erty in bankruptcy than outside, there is little exemption information which
the bankruptcy lawyer can convey to the debtor that is likely to alter the
debtor's decision if it has already been made.
A final possibility is implicit in our experimental design which, like the
incentive argument, focuses narrowly on exemption provisions and defines
incentive solely by reference to those provisions. The nature of exemption
provisions suggests a much more complicated reality captured neither by our
testing nor by the incentive argument. The value of an exemption to an in-
dividual depends not only on the size of the exemption provisions but also
on whether the debtor happens to own the specified property. Accordingly,
a disparity in exemption provisions will, in fact, offer an incentive only to
those debtors who have property not protected by the lower provisions
which is protected by the larger provisions. If, for example, a state's exemp-
tion provisions were less generous than the federal bankruptcy alternatives,
yet fully protected all assets of most of that state's debtors who might
choose bankruptcy, the theoretical incentive created by larger Code exemp-
tion provisions could, in fact, operate as an incentive only for the few whose
assets exceeded that state's particular limits and fit within the categories of
exempt property found in the Code. In that state the Code's relative
"generosity" in exemptions would be irrelevant to most debtors choosing
7
6D. STANmaY & M. GuTmH, BANrmTcy: PRousrs, PROCESS, RmEolu 47-49 (1971); Cf. Johnson,
supra note 2, at 35 wherein the author breaks what might be called creditor collection efforts into four dif-
ferent categories.
InJohnson, supra note 2 at 35.
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bankruptcy and evidence of the incentive would probably not appear in the
bankruptcy rates.
We could find no way to determine with any accuracy how many per-
sons choosing bankruptcy in the various states had the "right" kinds and
amounts of property to make the theoretical incentive, as we defined it, ac-
tually meaningful to them. One cannot therefore eliminate the possibility
that the "incentives" created by disparities in exemption provisions
themselves are simply irrelevant to many debtors in many places or that the
"generosity" of the Code's exemption provisions is lost on the vast bulk of
debtors filing chapter 7 petitions. The possibility that the exemption
mechanism might be increasingly irrelevant as a form of debtor protection in
an increasingly credit-oriented economy was raised nearly fifty years ago.78
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a substitute mechanism other
than welfare for protecting those debtors who own little or nothing which
an exemption might protect.
V. CONCLUSION
This study shows that states that have eliminated the disparity be-
tween exemptions available to debtors outside of bankruptcy and those
available to debtors in bankruptcy have not realized significantly lower
bankruptcy rates than those states which have continued to allow debtors
access to the Code's relatively higher bankruptcy exemptions. All states
that have eliminated the exemption disparity have done so by lowering the
federal level of exemptions to the state exemption level by opting-out. This
strongly suggests that reducing the present level of federal bankruptcy ex-
emptions will have an insignificant effect on bankruptcy rates because, as
this study shows, the state experience in reducing federal bankruptcy ex-
emptions has not resulted in reduced bankruptcy rates.
The inability to offer definitive explanations about the results of the
study underscores the complexity in debtor behavior not captured by a
superficial incentive argument such as the one examined here. The study
also counsels caution in too readily embracing the incentive approach to
legislation in this highly complex field. For in the context of voluntary
bankruptcy, the incentive approach supports the proposition that a drop in
the bankruptcy rates will follow if one simply reduces various debtor relief
provisions of the bankruptcy law, definitionally "attractive" to debtors. As
such, the approach - scientific-sounding and intuitively appealing - is
always available in a time of rising voluntary bankruptcy rates to support a
reduction in the debtor relief provisions of the law, changes that may well be
78Hamilton, In re the Small Debtor, 42 YALE LJ. 473, 481-82 (1933).
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counterindicated by economic or other policy considerations. In short, like
other analytical tools, the incentive approach, if used in this field without
adequate data and analysis, can distort and obscure rather than clarify
policy choices. If the delicate balance between the rights of debtors and
creditors in bankruptcy is to be shifted, a more compelling justification than
is offered by an oversimplified, untested incentive argument ought to be re-
quired.
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APPENDIX A - METHODOLOGY
Constructing samples of states with a hypothetical exemption-related
incentive to bankruptcy required, initially, ascertaining the "value" of each
state's and the Code's exemption provisions. In attempting to arrive at
estimates of value, it quickly became clear that some types of provisions
were either too difficult to evaluate or seemed of insubstantial importance to
warrant evaluation. Life insurance exemptions which are present in the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7),(8) (1980) and in all state exemp-
tion provisions, S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORs' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTEC-
TION 332 (3d ed. 1979), were not included in the evaluation nor were provi-
sions exempting health aids or rights to personal injury claims or awards. Ex-
emptions mandated by federal law apart from the Code are available in
bankruptcy to a debtor in an opt-out state, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A)(1980),
and generally to a debtor using the Code's exemptions, 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(10)(1980), and were therefore not counted in the evaluation process
either.
For purposes of the study, it was the "value" of the exemption provi-
sions that was important because the hypothesized incentive is said to arise
from those provisions themselves. Except as indicated above, it was thus
unimportant, for the purposes of the study, whether the typical debtor was
likely to have the type of property covered by a given provision and,
therefore, whether the provision was likely in fact to have an incentive ef-
fect on that "typical" debtor. Our effort, rather, was simply to test the in-
centive hypothesis as advanced by those pressing for a state to opt-out or by
those seeking to lower bankruptcy exemptions and, with them, consumer
bankruptcy rates. Our methodology was constructed in accordance with
that hypothesis.
The Reform Act's exemption provisions can illustrate the method we
followed in placing a value on a state's exemption provisions. Where a limit
was found in the statute (e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6)
(1980) ), that limit served as the "value" of that particular component of the
provisions. Where there was no limit in value, we estimated as consistently
as possible the likely value of such a provision to a debtor in a position to use
such a provision. For example, we estimated the general household goods
and furnishings provision of the Code (§ 522(d)(3)) to be worth $4,000.
The total of all such values, rounded off to the nearest $500, produced the
"value" of the provisions for our study. The Code's package was valued at
$14,500 in this manner. We did the same for each state. Values placed on
state exemption provisions are on file with the publisher.
Two types of limiting provisions found in state statutes, but not in the
Code, seriously complicated the valuing process. Many states have home,
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stead exemptions which, by their nature, are limited to debtors who own
real estate. The Code's homestead exemption of $7,500 is presently
available in'"any property" to the non-homeowner through 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(5), named the "spillover provision" by some and the "wild card" ex-
emption by others. The result was that in most places the value of the
state's exemptions would vary with the status of the debtor: if the debtor
were fortunate or wealthy enough to own a home, she had access to the
value of whatever homestead provision the state had; if the debtor did not
own a home, the state's provisions would typically afford substantially less
protection. Because the Code does not now discriminate between the two
groups, the exemption-related incentive to bankruptcy in a homestead state
will vary with the status of the debtor. Because studies have uniformly sug-
gested that the vast bulk of consumer bankrupts do not own real estate, we
excluded from our state valuations homestead or other exemptions which
were triggered by homeowner status. Such exemptions do not have much
relevance to the bulk of debtors that chooses bankruptcy and our samples
were constructed on that basis.
A second complicating type of provision found in state exemption provi-
sions is that which makes exemption protection turn on status as a "head of
household." While some researchers have gathered data on filings by "mar
ried" consumers, we found none for the somewhat different status of head of
household, even the definition of which can vary by state. Our solution was
to eliminate those ten states (see supra note 55) from the samples we
ultimately constructed.
Once values were ascertained, we determined "incentive" by simply
subtracting the state's non-bankruptcy exemption value from the state's
bankruptcy exemption value. If the bankruptcy value were larger, the state
was included in the "incentive" group for that fiscal year. This method in-
cluded in the incentive group non-opt-out states whose state exemptions are
smaller than the Code's as well as a handful of opt-out states who give their
debtors in bankruptcy more exempt property than debtors outside of
bankruptcy. In addition, if the applicable bankruptcy provisions were $6,000
or more larger than the state's, that state was also included in the "big incen
tive" subset for that year. On the other hand, if a state's exemption value
were larger than the Code's, that state was put into the "no incentive"
group since a debtor in that state would have access to the same larger ex-
emptions in both systems. For non-homeowners, only Texas was in this
category. Opt-out states who made their provisions the same for both
systems were the other members of the "no incentive" group.
The samples were different for each fiscal year because states have
opted-out each year since the Code became effective. Because the precise ef-
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fective dates of the legislation were often unavailable and because state fil-
ing figures were available only on a fiscal year basis, we had to develop a
convention for treating the effectiveness of legislation occurring during a
given period. For the period October 1, 1979-June 30, 1980 (the figures of
which were "inflated" to twelve-month figures for purposes of comparison),
we counted any opt-out occurring prior to February 1, 1980 as an opt-out
for the entire period; an opt-out after that time was not counted at all for
that first period under the Code. Following this first period, we counted any
pertinent legislation occurring from January 1-December 31 as affecting a
state's status for the entire new fiscal year which would begin on July 1 of
the calendar year and run through June of the next. Thus, under this con-
vention, opt-outs occurring on March 1, 1980 and on December 30, 1980
would both be treated as opt-outs for fiscal year 1981; any opt-out occurring
in calendar year 1981 would be considered an opt-out for fiscal 1982. The
members of the samples constructed in this manner are shown in Appendix
B.
Since bankruptcy filing statistics are available in a number of different
forms, it was also necessary to select the statistics with most relevance for
our study. If there is an exemption-related incentive to bankruptcy, one
would see that incentive operating most directly in chapter 7 of the Code
under which all debtor property not exempt is liquidated and distributed.
And since it is voluntary bankruptcy that the incentive might induce, the
figures for voluntary chapter 7 filings would most likely reflect any incentive
effects of differing exemption provisions in the two systems. It was these
figures that were used throughout.
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APPENDIX B - SAMPLES
NO-INCENTIVE
(1979-80)
Florida
Louisiana
Texas
Virginia
INCENTIVE
(1979-80)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
BIG-INCENTIVE
(1979-80)
Alabama
Arkansas
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
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NO-INCENTIVE
(1980-81)
Alabama
Arizona
Florida
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Nebraska
Tennessee
'Texas
Virginia
INCENTIVE
(1980,81)
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
BIG-INCENTIVE
(1980-81)
Arkansas
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Iowa
Maryland
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
